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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
In legislative action, its use has caused a court to declare an act uncer-
tain, and therefore invalid.9 It was held that although its use in a contract
was permissible and was equivalent to a direction that it be construed so
as to best accord with the equity of the case, such usage cannot apply to
statutes, since the legislature, in making its laws, must express its own
will and leave nothing to the mere will or caprice of the courts, particularly
in the matter of punishing offenses.' 0 But in Ex Parte Iratacable it was
held that the presence of thirty-two "and/or's" in a statute did not render
it uncertain."
George W. Wickersham, a noted member of the bar, said that the use
of the symbol in pleadings and court proceedings and in legislative acts is
utterly unjustified,' 2 and the majority of the courts seem entirely in accord
with this view. G. M.
ATTORNEYS-RULES OF COURT-RETROSPECTIVE LAws-[Missouri].-The
Missouri appelate courts in two recent cases' have been confronted with the
question whether the rules of the Supreme Court of Missouri 2 must operate
prospectively when invoked in ex parte proceedings instituted for the pur-
pose of disbarring attorneys. The Constitution of Missouri prohibits the
enactment of both ex post facto and retrospective laws. 3 In the Noel case,
the alleged professional misconduct of the respondent had occurred approxi-
mately ten years prior to the adoption of the rules of court. Therefore,
the respondent contended that those rules which provide for the investiga-
tion of conduct and which interdict certain conduct could not be invoked
against him without violating the constitutional provision to which allusion
has been made. The court, in dismissing this defense without discussion,
relied upon the Sparrow case, and held that rules of court need not operate
prospectively in cases of this character.
Mass., Mo., N. J., and N. Mexico. In at least 10 more states it has been
changed by judicial decision.
9. State v. Dudley, 159 La. 872, 106 So. 364 (1925).
10. Ibid. p. 365.
11. Ex parte Iratacable, 55 Nev. 263, 30 P. (2d) 284 (1934).
12. 18 A. B. A. Journal 574 (Sept., 1932).
1. In re Noell, 96 S. W. (2d) 213 (Mo. App. June, 1936) ; in re Sparrow,
90 S. W. (2d) 401 (Mo. Dec., 1935).
2. The rules were adopted by the Supreme Court in November, 1934. 334
Mo. (Appendix i).
3. Mo. Const. Art. 2, sec. 15. An ex post facto law has been defined as
one which makes an action done before the enactment of a statute penal or
criminal which was innocent when committed or which aggravates a crime
by making it greater than when committed or inflicts a greater punishment
than existed when the offense was committed. State ex rel. v. Works, 249
Mo. 702, 156 S. W. 967, 238 U. S. 41 (1913). The phrase ex post facto re-
lates exclusively to crimes. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 U. S. (L. ed.) 648(1798). Retroactive laws relate only to civil rights and proceedings. Glad-
ney v. Snydor, 172 Mo. 318, 72 S. W. 554 (1903). Thus, every ex post facto
law is retrospective, but every retrospective law is not an ex post facto law.
6 R. C. L. 303.
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In the Sparrow case, the alleged misconduct of the respondent had also
occurred some time before the adoption of the rules of court. He contended
that if applied to him, the new rules of procedure would, first, operate as
ex post facto laws; secondly, would operate as retrospective laws; and
thirdly, that section 3 of rule 36, giving the appropriate Bar Committee
power to investigate professional conduct in a summary manner, denied him
due process of law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment of the Consti-
tution of the United States. In denying all of these defenses, the court held,
first, that a disbarment proceeding is not a criminal prosecution; that it is
neither criminal nor civil but is a proceeding sui generis; and that its object
is not punishment of the offender but protection of the court. Therefore, the
inhibition against ex post facto laws is inapplicable. Secondly, since the
question of moral fitness or the due observance of professional ethics must
necessarily be determined upon preexisting facts, the contention that the
rules are retrospective has no validity. Thirdly, rule 36 is merely regula-
tory, and by giving notice and hearing, it does not violate the fourteenth
amendment.
In considering the defenses and the holding in the Sparrow case, it
should first be noted that the rule that disbarment proceedings are neither
civil nor criminal is fairly well settled,4 although there are dicta to the con-
trary.5 Moreover, although a rule of court touching upon procedure before
the court must operate prospectively-e. g., a rule of court relative to ab-
stracts of the record on appeal does not apply to abstracts filed before its
adoption6-yet rules applicable to procedure in disbarment need not operate
prospectively, because such action is neither civil nor criminal. Finally, if a
retrospective law (and this includes a rule of court) is neither ex post facto
nor one which impairs the obligation of contract, it may still be unconstitu-
tlional because of violation of due process of law, 7 an objection to which it
was held rule 36 was not open.
The principle that the power of the courts over the bar is fundamental,
a power which the courts have in the past allowed the legislatures to largely
usurp, is forcibly expressed in the new rules of the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri.8 Although the right to remove or to suspend attorneys for unworthy
conduct is said to exist in all courts having the power to admit attorneys to
the bar, independent of any statutory enactment, 9 the courts have not been
active in the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction.O Nevertheless, it is ap-
parent from the cases under discussion that the Missouri judiciary is
4. In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 62 S. W. (2d) 672 (1933).
5. Mc Cord v. State ex rel. Allen, 220 Ala. 466, 126 So. 873 (1930);
State v. Flynn, 160 La. 483, 107 So. 314 (1926).
6. Dalton v. Register, 248 Mo. 150, 154 S. W. 67 (1913); State ex rel.
Duckett v. Bender, 239 S. W. 833 (Mo. 1922).
7. Lowe v. Harris, 112 N. C. 472, 17 S. E. 539 (1892).
8. Clark, The Rules of the Supreme Court of Missouri and Their Admin-
istration (1936) 7 Mo. Bar Journal 3.
9. State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Harber, 129 Mo. 271, 31 S. W. 889(1895).
10. Beardsley, Effective Bar Organization (1936), 7 Mo. Bar Journal 7.
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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
awakening to the importance of one of its traditional functions. From the
promulgation of the new rules of court, the conclusion is irresistible that
the court considers the statutory grounds of disbarment"i directory rather
than mandatory, and that it is assuming complete control over the conduct
of attorneys. And since this is an inherent judicial function, 12 the court
is clearly exercising a power reserved to it by the Constitution of Mis-
souri.14  J. L. F.
AUTOMOBmLEs-ADERTSING-WRRANTY-[Federal]. -The acute ques-
tion whether the sub-purchaser of a chattel may maintain an action against
the manufacturer for breach of warranty, upon the theory that the manufac-
turer's advertising constituted a representational warranty to the sub-pur-
chaser, has again come up for decision in the recent case of Chanin V. Chev-
rolet Motor Company.1
The plaintiff, who had purchased an automobile from a dealer, joined the
manufacturer as co-defendant in a suit to recover damages for injuries
caused by the breaking of a windshield which the manufacturer had adver-
tised as being shatterproof. The court adhered to the orthodox rule and held
that suit for damages for breach of warranty cannot be maintained where
there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and defendant, and that
the advertisements did not constitute such a contract as to bind the manu-
facturer.
It should be noted that this action was not based upon fraud or deceit,
although a manufacturer's untrue advertisement, made with knowledge of
its untruth, might be the basis for such an action.2 Nor was the action one
in tort, based upon the conception that the windshield was intrinsically
dangerous to human life, so as to come within the rule of Mac Pherson v.
Buick Motor Company,3 but was an action strictly on warranty.
There are, generally speaking, three classes of warranties. The first is
the promissory warranty which is purely contractual;4 the second is the
warranty based upon representations, regardless of whether or not the per-
son making the representations intended to be bound thereby; 5 the third is
the warranty imposed by law, commonly termed "implied warranty."6 It
11. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 11707.
12. Supra, note 9.
13. Mo. Const. Art 3 (1875).
1. 15 F. Supp. 57 (D. C. N. C. Ill., 1935) ; now pending appeal.
2. Marsh v. Usk Hardware Co., 73 Wash. 543, 132 Pac. 241 (1913); see
Alpine v. Friend Bros., 138 N. E. 553 (Mass. 1923).
3. 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050, Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 440 L. R. A. 1916 F;
for a recent case based upon this doctrine see Bird v. Ford Motor Company,
15 F. Supp. 590 (D. C. W. D. N. Y. 1936).
4. Holcombe and Hoke Mfg. Co. v. Osterberg, 181 Minn. 547, 233 N. W.
302 (1930) ; Palawink v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 57 N. D. 199, 220 N. W.
638 (1928).
5. Uniform Sales Act, sec. 12; 1 Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924) sec. 197,
200, 201.
6. Uniform Sales Act, sec. 12-16, for implied warranties of title, quality,
etc.; see also Foote v. Wilson, 104 Kans. 191, 178 Pac. 430 (1919).
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